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A bank supervised by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) filed a formal appeal with the Ombudsman disputing conclusions communicated in the most recent report of examination (ROE). Specifically, the bank appealed the following:
The appeal disputed the violation of 12 CFR 21.21(d)(1) (internal controls pillar). The appeal asserted that the bank’s policies and procedures set forth a robust system of internal controls to comply with laws and regulations, as confirmed by three third parties and prior examination teams. The appeal contended that the SO’s criticisms were based on isolated incidents that did not constitute systemic deficiencies warranting a formal violation.
The appeal disputed the violation of 12 CFR 21.21(d)(3) (Bank Secrecy Act Officer (BSA Officer) pillar). The appeal asserted that the pillar imposed a skeletal requirement to designate an individual(s). The appeal contended that the pillar does not discuss qualifications, training, or resources; nevertheless, the bank designated a qualified individual and provided ample training and resources. Further, the appeal asserted that the violation was unwarranted because the ROE stated that the bank’s Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)/anti-money laundering (AML) program met the minimum requirements of 12 CFR 21.21.
The appeal disputed the downgrade of Commercial Loan A’s rating from pass to special mention. The appeal noted that the loan had a current payment status, strong loan-to-value ratio, appropriate covenants, and a strong guarantor with substantial liquid assets who demonstrated willingness.
The appeal disputed the downgrade of the asset quality component rating from a 2 to a 3. The appeal stated that credit administration practices were satisfactory and that key asset quality metrics were virtually identical to the previous examination when the rating was a 2. The appeal contended that the bank’s concentration risk management was satisfactory and the commercial real estate (CRE) loan portfolio did not meet the thresholds outlined in OCC Bulletin 2006-46 for enhanced supervisory analysis. The appeal also disagreed with the examiners’ loan rating downgrades initiated during the examination.
The appeal disputed the downgrade of the liquidity component rating from a 2 to a 3. The appeal contended that the bank’s funds management practices had not deteriorated since the prior examination and the criticisms were “modest” weaknesses consistent with a 2 rating. The appeal asserted that while the bank was endeavoring to increase retail deposits, the bank had sufficient sources of funds on acceptable terms to meet present and anticipated liquidity needs. The appeal also asserted that the bank complied with all limits with one exception as of the examination date.
The appeal disputed the downgrade of the sensitivity to market risk component rating from a 2 to a 3. The appeal asserted that the commentary in the ROE was complimentary and aligned with a 2 rating. The appeal also noted that a recent third-party report had indicated minimal interest rate sensitivity.
The appeal disputed the downgrade of the earnings component rating to a 4. The appeal asserted that the bank’s earnings met the definition of a 3 rating. The appeal contended that earnings had been negatively impacted by provisions for loan losses related to three problem assets, and the allowance for credit losses (ACL) was sufficient to cover future charge-offs. The appeal also noted that management had entered a loss share agreement to mitigate future losses for a portfolio of unsecured consumer loans purchased from a third party.
The appeal disputed the downgrade of the capital component rating to a 3, contending the rating did not reflect the bank’s satisfactory level of capital relative to its risk profile and well-capitalized Prompt Corrective Action status. The appeal asserted that the board and management had implemented capital growth initiatives and developed a robust capital plan based on methodology used by the Federal Reserve in capital stress tests of large banks.
The appeal disputed the downgrade of the management component rating from a 2 to a 3. The appeal contended that prior management was the reason for the purported deficiencies noted during the examination. The appeal asserted that examiner concerns pertaining to growing and restarting two products or services did not appropriately incorporate management’s understanding and planning for these business lines. The appeal disputed the BSA pillar violations issued in prior reports of examinations. The appeal disputed model validation criticisms, noting that the supervisory office (SO) misinterpreted the timing requirements of the bank’s policies and procedures.
The appeal disputed the downgrade of the composite rating to a 3. The appeal asserted that the bank fits the regulatory definition of a 2 rating and that the criticisms noted in the ROE were within the board and management’s capacity and willingness to correct.
The Ombudsman conducted a comprehensive review of the appeal using the following supervisory standards in effect at the time of the examination:
Except for Commercial Loan A’s classification, the Ombudsman concurred with the SO. Regarding Commercial Loan A’s rating downgrade from pass to special mention, the Ombudsman determined that the loan should be rated substandard. In addition, the Ombudsman determined a different method of calculation and amount for the ACL allocated to Commercial Loan B that the bank did not specifically appeal. The Ombudsman directed the SO to revise and reissue the ROE to reflect the appeal decisions.
The Ombudsman concurred with the internal controls pillar violation of 12 CFR 21.21(d)(1) due to internal control deficiencies for a high-risk product. Deficiencies existed in the bank’s risk assessment, customer due diligence and enhanced due diligence (CDD/EDD), customer identification program (CIP), and suspicious activity monitoring for the high-risk product. Systemic deficiencies in several areas of critical internal controls substantially impaired the effectiveness of the internal controls pillar and are sufficient to justify a violation, particularly when the deficiencies involve a high-risk product. The risk assessment failed to accurately identify or measure the inherent risk in the bank’s product considering the volume and growth, did not consider the lack of sufficient BSA staff to monitor activity, and contained incomplete and inaccurate product information. CDD/EDD and CIP practices, which the bank outsourced to third parties, were inadequate as management did not verify that the third parties were complying with bank and regulatory requirements. The bank was not obtaining information on new accounts opened by third parties and did not verify if the third parties followed CIP policy requirements. Suspicious activity monitoring was not commensurate with the high-risk profile of the product. Management did not implement fraud alerts within the bank’s BSA monitoring system and was reliant on third parties to report suspicious activity. The appeal’s assertion of isolated instances is not persuasive given the number and significance of internal control weaknesses combined with the volume of activity identified during the examination.
The appeal incorrectly stated that three third parties found the bank’s system of internal controls in compliance with legal requirements. The scope of the BSA/AML audit was inadequate as it failed to conduct independent transaction testing to evaluate the effectiveness of internal controls for the high-risk product. The other two reviews identified concerns regarding the bank’s compliance with the BSA requirements for the high-risk product that were consistent with weaknesses, including CIP and CDD violations, identified by the examiners.
The Ombudsman concurred with the SO’s decision to cite the BSA Officer pillar violation of 12 CFR 21.21(d)(3). The FFIEC BSA/AML Examination Manual explains that the board is responsible for ensuring that the BSA Officer has sufficient authority and resources (monetary, physical, and personnel) to administer an effective BSA/AML compliance program based on the bank’s risk profile. The bank’s designated BSA Officer lacked sufficient experience, training, and resources to effectively manage the bank’s BSA program. The BSA Officer did not have prior experience with the bank’s high-risk product and did not receive sufficient training to develop the necessary technical skills. The BSA compliance resources did not keep pace with the bank’s significant growth in the high-risk product; therefore, staff could not keep pace with the volume of transaction monitoring alerts and third-party monitoring reports. The BSA Officer also failed to alert the board to the insufficient staffing level driving the backlog of alerts and periodic monitoring.
The appeal misinterpreted the hierarchy of BSA supervisory criticisms when it noted that the pillar violation was not supported because the ROE stated that the BSA/AML program met the minimum requirements of 12 CFR 21.21. Citing a bank in violation of the individual pillars of the BSA compliance program is different than citing a violation of the overall BSA compliance program. The distinction and resulting consequences of each are important, as discussed in OCC Bulletin 2020-75. If the SO determined the bank to be in violation of the overall BSA compliance program, the OCC must, by statute, issue a consent order. Deficiencies in individual pillars can be cited separately when the weaknesses do not rise to the level of rendering the program ineffective when viewed as a whole.
The Ombudsman determined that the appealed Commercial Loan A should be rated substandard, which differed from the special mention rating assigned by the SO and the pass rating asserted in the appeal. The loan exhibited well-defined weaknesses based on a negative debt service coverage ratio using the most current rent rolls and unreliable and unsubstantiated proforma rent rolls. While the guarantor showed willingness by funding the interest reserve, there was no documentation of the guarantor’s financial capacity to carry the loan if new leases were not signed for the property. Lease proposals included rent concessions for 11 months beginning at lease execution, which could place additional challenges to meet cash flow expectations upon the start of principal and interest payments. Accrual status as of the examination date was appropriate based on payment history and collateral. However, the appraisal was outdated and no longer reliable as the high vacancy level as of the examination called into question the property condition and value. The Ombudsman instructed the bank to obtain a new appraisal or evaluation of the subject property and to reassess the loan rating and accrual status. The Ombudsman also instructed the bank to recalculate the reserve allocated to the loan and make any necessary provisions to the ACL.
The Ombudsman concurred with the SO’s decision of a 3 rating for the asset quality component. A rating of 3 is assigned when asset quality or credit administration practices are less than satisfactory. Trends may be stable or indicate deterioration in asset quality or an increase in risk exposure. The level and severity of classified assets, other weaknesses, and risks require an elevated level of supervisory concern. There is generally a need to improve credit administration and risk management practices. Refer to the “Bank Supervision Process” booklet.
The bank’s quantity of credit risk was high given a high level of credit losses, a high volume of non-performing and past-due loans, elevated problem loan levels, and significant concentrations. The most significant contributor to the quantity of credit risk was the high level of losses from a portfolio of unsecured consumer loan pools purchased from a third party. Although the classified assets as a percentage of tier 1 capital plus the ACL ratio was similar to the prior examination, other metrics demonstrated higher risk levels and negative impact to capital and earnings. The quality of risk management was weak, supported by deficiencies in credit risk identification, annual review processes, problem loan management, concentration risk management, and the ACL.
Concentration risk management practices need improvement. The bank’s total and non-owner occupied CRE concentrations were high and increasing, and management increased the concentration limit during the supervisory cycle. OCC Bulletin 2006-46 states institutions should not view the criteria in the CRE guidance as a “safe harbor” if other risk indicators are present and clarifies that examiners will consider other factors in evaluating the risk posed by an institution’s CRE concentration. Examiners accurately identified weaknesses with concentration oversight, policy and risk limits, market analysis, management information systems and reporting, and portfolio management processes.
The Ombudsman reviewed the loans downgraded by the examiners. Except for the appealed Commercial Loan A discussed above and Commercial Loan B discussed next, the Ombudsman concurred with the examiner-initiated downgrades and credit risk identification criticisms for the remaining loans in the sample. The Ombudsman reviewed Commercial Loan B from the sample that examiners rated substandard with a nonaccrual designation and concurred with the rating and nonaccrual designation but differed from both the bank and the SO on the ACL amount and discounted cash flow calculation method. The Ombudsman determined that the bank used an incorrect method for calculating the amount of the ACL that led to an underestimate of the reserve required for the loan.
A substandard classification was warranted for Commercial Loan B as the loan had well-defined weaknesses given a debt service coverage ratio of 0.91x and a significant collateral shortfall. The property continued to show low occupancy rates and a decline in debt service coverage ratio. Further, guarantor capacity to carry the loan was unknown as there was no evidence of a documented analysis. Repayment of the loan was expected from the operation of the collateral, deeming the loan collateral dependent. Foreclosure was not probable given satisfactory payment history under contractual terms and close to break-even debt service coverage, as of the examination. OCC Bulletin 2023-11 states that the ACL for a collateral-dependent loan is measured using the fair value of collateral, regardless of whether foreclosure is probable. When estimating the ACL for a collateral dependent loan, the fair value of collateral should be adjusted to consider estimated costs to sell, if repayment or satisfaction of the loan depends on the sale of the collateral. ACL adjustments for estimated costs to sell are not appropriate when the repayment of a collateral-dependent loan is expected from the operation of the collateral. For Commercial Loan B, based on the fair value of collateral method of calculation, the bank should have reserved significantly more for the collateral deficiency. The Ombudsman instructed the SO to revise the ROE to reflect the correct ACL amount and calculation method decisions.
The Ombudsman concurred with the SO’s decision of a 3 rating for the liquidity component. A rating of 3 indicates liquidity levels or funds management practices in need of improvement. Institutions rated 3 may lack ready access to funds on reasonable terms or may evidence significant weaknesses in funds management practices. Refer to the “Bank Supervision Process” booklet. In this case, liquidity levels and funds management practices needed improvement, and liquidity sources were not sufficient to meet present and potential needs at a reasonable cost. The bank’s liquidity risk profile increased during the supervisory cycle as the board and management obtained a greater amount of credit and rate sensitive funds to support increased growth. The bank lacked sufficient on-hand liquidity, was highly reliant on non-core funding sources, and had a high cost of funds. Liquidity risk limits and stress testing were ineffective. Although the bank complied with all liquidity policy limits except one, examiners appropriately criticized management for setting ineffective limits or increasing limits to excessively high levels that further increased liquidity risk. The board did not review and revise policy limits to set safe and sound risk tolerances despite changes in the bank’s risk profile, funding strategy, and liquidity levels.
The Ombudsman concurred with the SO’s decision of a 3 rating for the sensitivity to market risk component. A rating of 3 indicates control of market risk sensitivity that needs improvement or that there is significant potential that the earnings performance or capital position will be adversely affected. Risk management practices need to be improved given the size, sophistication, and level of market risk accepted by the institution. The level of earnings and capital may not adequately support the amount of market risk taken by the institution. Refer to the “Bank Supervision Process” booklet. In this case, there was significant potential that earnings performance or capital position would be adversely affected due to deficient earnings and inadequate capital levels for the risks assumed. Although interest rate risk (IRR) model results projected limited sensitivity to rate changes, existing earnings and capital levels could not withstand any negative effect from interest rate fluctuations. IRR management practices needed improvement as the board and asset liability committee (ALCO) did not provide effective oversight and governance over the IRR management function.
The Ombudsman concurred with the appeal that the ROE included complimentary statements regarding the bank’s asset-liability management policy, IRR limits, and measurement systems. The ROE inaccurately stated that model assumptions and practices were accurate and consistent with regulatory guidance. This statement did not align with the concerns communicated in the matters requiring attention (MRA) cited for board and ALCO oversight. The Ombudsman directed the SO to revise the ROE to state that governance over model assumptions and validation needs to improve.
The Ombudsman concurred with the rating of 4 for the earnings component. A rating of 4 indicates earnings that are deficient. Earnings are insufficient to support operations and maintain appropriate capital and allowance levels. Institutions so rated may be characterized by erratic fluctuations in net income or net interest margin, the development of significant negative trends, nominal or unsustainable earnings, intermittent losses, or a substantive drop in earnings from the previous years. Refer to the “Bank Supervision Process” booklet. In this case, earnings were deficient and insufficient to support operations while maintaining appropriate capital and ACL levels. The bank experienced a significant net loss as of the examination date, eroding capital rather than allowing for capital accretion. The primary cause for the net loss position was asset quality deterioration, particularly from the unsecured consumer loan portfolio purchased from a third party. The loss sharing agreement with the portfolio’s third-party seller and the bank’s reserve allocation for the portfolio did not overcome the deficient earnings conclusion. The third party’s financial capacity to meet the loss sharing agreement was unknown and the loss share was for only a portion of any losses the bank would incur in the future. The Ombudsman required the bank to document the third party’s financial condition and ability to meet the terms of the loss share agreement using the most current audited financial statement. In addition, the Ombudsman required management to evaluate whether the ACL for the portfolio of unsecured loans remained adequate and allocate additional provisions, if needed.
The Ombudsman concurred with the rating of 3 for the capital component. A rating of 3 indicates a less than satisfactory level of capital that does not fully support the institution’s risk profile. Institutions with capital of 3 may exceed minimum regulatory and statutory requirements even when levels are considered less than satisfactory. Refer to the “Bank Supervision Process” booklet. In this case, capital did not fully support the bank’s risk profile that had increased due to a higher volume of classified and non-performing assets, a high level of credit losses, and an increase in non-owner occupied CRE and non-core funding concentrations. Compliance and operational risks also increased with the growth in the high-risk product without commensurate risk management controls.
During the supervisory cycle, the SO had issued an Individual Minimum Capital Ratio (IMCR) letter to the bank. At the time of the examination, the leverage ratio did not meet the minimum ratios required by the IMCR. The holding company did not have the ability to support the bank and relied on dividends from the bank to repay its debt. In addition, management had not developed an adequate capital plan. Stress testing provided with the appeal was out of the appeal’s scope because examiners did not have the document available during the examination. Given the 3 rating for capital, deficient earnings, high and increasing risks for all but one of the risk assessment categories, and limited holding company support, the Ombudsman concluded a capital plan MRA was warranted. The Ombudsman directed the SO to include a capital plan MRA in the revised ROE. The board and management must maintain capital commensurate with the level and nature of all risks to which the bank is exposed. The SO is not precluded from downgrading capital component rating to a 3 or establishing minimum capital levels, even if the bank is deemed well capitalized for Prompt Corrective Action purposes.
The Ombudsman concurred with the SO’s decision of a 3 rating for the management component. rating of 3 indicates management and board performance that need improvement or risk management practices that are less than satisfactory given the nature of the institution’s activities. The capabilities of management or the board may be insufficient for the type, size, or condition of the institution. Problems and significant risks may be inadequately identified, measured, monitored, or controlled. Refer to the “Bank Supervision Process” booklet.
Board and management performance needed improvement, and the Ombudsman affirmed deficiencies in several key areas, including board and management oversight, BSA/AML processes, credit risk identification and loan administration, ACL, ALCO oversight, and liquidity risk management. In addition, the bank violated two BSA pillars related to internal controls and the BSA Officer and the quality of risk management was weak or insufficient for most of the risk categories. The management rating considered both past and existing management’s decisions and their effect on the bank’s safety and soundness. Board minutes reflected a focus on growth and income and lacked discussions regarding risks and commensurate growth in compliance staff. The level and quality of oversight of various high-risk areas was insufficient as the board and management chose to grow high-risk products without strengthening risk management practices. The strategic plan in place at the time of the examination was outdated and had not been reviewed annually to ensure it aligned with actual growth limits and controls and plans for appropriate staffing and resources. Regardless of the intent of the bank’s model validation policies and procedures, the prolonged lack of validation of the bank’s high-risk BSA monitoring system was inappropriate.
The Ombudsman concurred with the SO’s decision of a 3 composite rating. Banks rated 3 exhibit some degree of supervisory concern in one or more of the component areas. These financial institutions exhibit a combination of weaknesses that may range from moderate to severe; however, the magnitude of the deficiencies generally will not cause a component to be rated more severely than 4. Management may lack the ability or willingness to effectively address weaknesses within appropriate time frames. Financial institutions in this group generally are less capable of withstanding business fluctuations and are more vulnerable to outside influences than those institutions rated a composite 1 or 2. Additionally, these financial institutions may be in significant noncompliance with laws and regulations. Risk management practices may be less than satisfactory relative to the institution’s size, complexity, and risk profile. These financial institutions require more than normal supervision, which may include formal or informal enforcement actions. Failure appears unlikely, however, given the overall strength and financial capacity of these institutions. Refer to the “Bank Supervision Process” booklet.
In this case, the bank’s condition was less than satisfactory. Earnings were deficient and the weaknesses in capital, asset quality, management, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk supported downgrades in those component ratings. The bank’s financial condition was unable to withstand risks from market rates or losses in asset quality. All but one of the risk assessment categories was high and increasing, and risk management practices were insufficient to manage the bank’s elevated risk profile.