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Appeal of Matters Requiring Attention (Third Quarter 2024)

Background

A bank supervised by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) filed a formal appeal with the Ombudsman disputing the supervisory office’s (SO) determinations to cite matters requiring attention (MRA) in the most recent report of examination (ROE). Specifically, the bank appealed the following MRAs:

  • Loan risk rating identification
  • Annual credit review process
  • Exception monitoring and underwriting
  • Independent loan review
  • Allowance for credit losses (ACL)
  • Unsecured lending policies and practices
  • Concentration risk management
  • Investment risk management
  • Liquidity risk management

Discussion

The appeal asserted that the loan risk rating identification MRA was unwarranted. The appeal also disputed the SO’s decisions regarding loan rating changes and the charge-off of certain loans. The appeal noted that the bank’s risk rating system was sufficient.

The appeal asserted that the annual credit review process MRA was unwarranted. The appeal contended that the bank’s annual credit review process was sufficient, and that the board and management were aware of and focused on the lack of current borrower financial information in its loan portfolio.

The appeal contended that the exception monitoring and underwriting MRA was unwarranted. The appeal asserted that the bank’s loan exception report was adequate. The appeal disagreed with the conclusion that multiple revolving lines of credit did not specify a loan purpose beyond “working capital needs.” The appeal also contended that while the bank may need to revisit the loan policy to address re-margining of lot development loans, an MRA was not warranted.

The appeal asserted that the independent loan review MRA was unwarranted. The appeal disagreed that the third-party loan review had failed to downgrade loans and identify the exceptions that the SO detected during the examination. The appeal noted that the bank had established an appropriate policy detailing the requirements for an independent loan review.

The appeal asserted that the ACL MRA was unwarranted. The appeal contended that ACL levels were appropriate in relation to existing credit risks and that the specific credit allocations were consistent with the bank’s methodologies.

The appeal contended that the unsecured lending policies and practices MRA was unwarranted. The appeal noted that the bank’s loan policy had provisions for unsecured lending and that the bank underwrote and monitored secured and unsecured loans in the same manner. The appeal also disagreed with the unsecured determination for a relationship criticized by the SO.

The appeal asserted that the concentration risk management MRA was unwarranted. The appeal stated that the board reviewed a concentration report monthly, discussed it in detail, approved any changes or exceptions to limits, and was aware of future lending plans.

The appeal contended that the investment risk management MRA was unwarranted. The appeal disputed the conclusion that the board had not provided meaningful documentation requirements to analyze the investments’ credit, interest rate, compliance, strategic, and liquidity risks and had not ensured alignment with board risk tolerances prior to purchase. The appeal noted that management and board members had extensive capital markets experience and asserted that completing independent analyses did not add value. The appeal noted that the bank reviews third-party prepurchase reports that provide analysis for each prospective investment.

The appeal asserted that the liquidity risk management MRA was unwarranted. The appeal stated that quarterly liquidity reports included a quantitative assessment of funding needs under stress events and measured availability of contingent funding sources. The appeal also noted that management’s decision to operate outside the policy limit for non-core funding dependence had been reflected in status reports provided at every board meeting, and the board concluded that the circumstances warranted a temporary exception. In addition, the appeal disagreed with the determination that the bank’s on-hand liquidity calculation was inappropriate.

Supervisory Standards

The Ombudsman conducted a comprehensive review of the appeal using the supervisory standards in effect at the time of the examination including:

Conclusions

The Ombudsman concurred with the SO for all MRAs appealed but required additional edits to the report of examination (ROE) for accuracy.

The Ombudsman concurred with the SO’s decision to issue the loan risk rating identification MRA. The bank failed to maintain accurate loan risk rating processes and effective, accurate, and timely charge-off practices. The Ombudsman reviewed each loan rating downgrade and charge-off directed during the examination and concurred with the SO. The bank’s policy and practice of waiting to charge off a loan until a loss can be defined was inconsistent with regulatory risk ratings, the BAAS, and the call report instructions and could result in overstating asset and capital positions. Banks should not maintain an asset on the balance sheet if realizing its value would require long-term litigation or other lengthy recovery efforts. Losses are to be recorded in the period an obligation becomes uncollectable. Each of the loans that the SO directed the bank to charge off was collateral dependent and therefore should have been measured by the collateral dependent method required by the call report instructions. Specifically, any portion of the amortized cost basis in excess of the fair value of collateral less estimated costs to sell, if applicable, that can be identified as uncollectible should be promptly charged off against the ACL. Refer to the “Rating Credit Risk” booklet of the Comptroller’s Handbook and the BAAS (Section 12D, Question 3) for additional details.

The Ombudsman concurred with the SO’s decision to issue the annual credit review process MRA. The bank failed to ensure timely receipt of updated borrower financial information and completion of timely annual credit reviews in accordance with bank policy and safe and sound standards. More than 50 percent of commercial and agricultural relationships lacked current borrower financials and had past due annual reviews.

The Ombudsman concurred with the SO’s decision to issue the exception monitoring and underwriting MRA. The bank failed to effectively track, report, and control policy exceptions. The bank’s policy did not distinguish between critical and non-critical exceptions, management did not complete trend analysis, and the board had not established exception limits. In addition, the Ombudsman concurred with the high level of critical exceptions that the SO identified in the loan sample. An excessive volume or a pattern of exceptions may signal an unintended or unwarranted relaxation of the bank’s underwriting practices. If the volume of exceptions is high, the board may be prompted to reconsider its tolerance for risk; to revise the bank’s general loan policy to bring it more into line with the bank’s credit culture or current market conditions; to place new limits on the aggregate volume of exceptions; or to change the type of exceptions permitted in the bank’s loan portfolio. Aggregate exception levels should be analyzed regularly and reported to the board to allow the board and management to satisfactorily evaluate underwriting practices and assess the level of compliance with the general loan policy.

Further, the Ombudsman concurred with the SO that the bank did not appropriately administer working capital lines of credit and lot development loans. The loan sample reviewed by the examiners identified instances in which extensions of credit did not include borrowing base certificates or were not supported by current listings of accounts receivable and/or inventory. The Ombudsman determined that the ROE did not state that “working capital needs” is not an acceptable use of loan proceeds, as the appeal asserted. Instead, the SO’s concern was that loans in the sample did not appear to be for working capital needs and had not revolved as intended at origination. Twelve CFR 30 references that an institution should establish and maintain loan documentation practices that identify the purpose of a loan and the source of repayment and should assess the ability of the borrower to repay the indebtedness in a timely manner.

In addition, the Ombudsman concurred with the SO that bank policies, as well as specific loans identified in the ROE, lacked lot development curtailment or re-margining requirements. Prudent development and construction loan policies include requirements for principal curtailments to allow for periodic re-margining if lot sales or prices fall short of projections.

The Ombudsman concurred with the SO’s decision to issue the independent loan review MRA. The bank had not established an effective independent loan review process. The most recent independent loan review failed to downgrade three loans or identify critical exceptions that the SO detected in the loan sample. In addition, the loan review report generally noted current financial statements despite the bank’s internal tracking report indicating missing financial statements for more than 50 percent of commercial and agriculture relationships. Further, the bank did not have an appropriate policy outlining the requirements for independent loan review. The policy should detail the qualifications and independence of credit risk review personnel; the frequency, scope, and depth of reviews; review of findings and follow-up; and communication and distribution of results.

The Ombudsman concurred with the SO’s decision to issue the ACL MRA. The ACL was underfunded as the bank did not accurately risk rate loans, identify specific allocations or charge-downs on individually evaluated loans, and appropriately support qualitative factors. As noted previously, risk ratings did not accurately represent loan portfolio risks. In addition, the bank failed to maintain sufficient specific credit allocations in accordance with accounting standards and an overall effective ACL methodology. Qualitative factor allocations for changes in staff depth and experience and changes in loan review and oversight were both 0 percent, and the factor for changes in credit quality was 0.25 percent. Given the findings in the ROE regarding the loan portfolio and credit related MRAs, these allocations were inappropriate. Bank management failed to identify charge-offs in a timely and accurate manner and needs to assess the ACL for additional unknown risk.

The Ombudsman concurred with the SO’s decision to issue the unsecured lending policies and practices MRA. The loan policy did not provide appropriate guidance on underwriting, monitoring practices, or risk tolerances for unsecured lending. The bank should have a policy that details the terms and conditions for each type of lending product offered. In addition, the loan policy and concentration report did not include a concentration limit for unsecured loans. The relationship criticized by the SO was unsecured, as reflected in the bank’s loan presentation.

The Ombudsman also determined that the bank failed to conduct an appropriate independent analysis of the unsecured loan participation that the bank purchased. The loan presentation did not ensure the loan aligned with bank underwriting standards. The loan presentation stated that the bank did not conduct financial underwriting on the borrower. Further, the loan presentation did not include details in the sections for capacity, cash flow, collateral, and guarantors; instead, it referred the reader to the third-party write up for each of those sections. To make a prudent credit decision, the bank should conduct an independent credit analysis to determine whether the loan participation meets internal credit standards.

The Ombudsman concurred with the SO’s decision to issue the concentration risk management MRA. The bank exceeded concentration limits without action plans to reduce exposure, did not adequately support concentration limit increases, and lacked a concentration limit for non-owner occupied commercial real estate loans despite the segment representing a significant concentration. The Ombudsman concluded that concentration reports demonstrated that the bank was operating outside of board established concentration limits for vacant land, consumer residential first liens, consumer residential second liens, and retail loan segments. Board minutes, concentration reports, loan committee minutes, and other documentation reviewed did not reflect the board’s approval of the breaches or management’s justifications and plans. Further, board minutes and approval documentation did not include support for increases in concentration limits since the prior examination. The loan policy did not provide management effective expectations to manage concentrations, as indicated by the lack of action taken for the breached concentration limits.

If exceptions to a particular policy are approaching or breaching risk limits, the board should take appropriate action, which includes assessing the policy, risk appetite, or strategy. Adjustments to the strategy may include slowing growth, placing a temporary moratorium on activities, or exiting the line of business. In addition, exceeding or modifying established risk limits should require the board’s explicit approval. Any proposed changes to the bank’s underwriting standards should be evaluated to determine how the change will affect overall portfolio risk.

The Ombudsman concurred with the SO’s decision to issue the investment risk management MRA. The bank did not adequately document prepurchase or ongoing analysis of investment securities, board reporting was insufficient, board limits did not fully align with policy, and the bank did not complete an evaluation of impaired securities on an individual basis. The size, composition, and growth of the investment portfolio warranted the issuance of this MRA. The investment portfolio consisted of a significant amount of higher risk securities.

The Ombudsman determined that the MRA did not criticize the board and management’s investment knowledge and expertise as the appeal contended. Instead, the MRA required the board and management to establish prudent practices and ensure compliance with 12 CFR 1.5(c) documentation standards for investments. The template that management used to document the prepurchase analysis was a checklist for credit risk related factors with no consideration for other risks required by 12 CFR 1.5(a), such as interest rate, compliance, strategic, and liquidity risks. It is an acceptable practice for banks to use the services of third parties who compile and provide investment analytics for bank management. However, management must perform its own independent analysis and avoid overreliance on a third party’s analysis.

Board reporting of the investment portfolio was insufficient. Reporting detail and segmentation was insufficient given the size and nature of the investment portfolio and primarily consisted of recent investment purchases and metrics using broad portfolio categories. Reporting did not sufficiently segment the portfolio based on credit or economic risk drivers and reflected most of the investments under the categories of corporate MBSs and other investments. Within these two broad segments, the bank had various types of investments such as student loan and auto pools, private label residential MBSs, private label commercial MBSs, and collateralized loan obligations. Each of these investment types perform differently and have specific risk characteristics. Given the size and nature of the investment portfolio, board reporting should have included additional detail. Further, investment risk limits in board reports did not fully align with the limits outlined in the bank’s Asset Liability Committee (ALCO) Policy.

Finally, the bank did not complete an evaluation of impaired securities on an individual basis. Under ASC Subtopic 326-30, available-for-sale (AFS) debt securities follow the AFS debt securities model, rather than the current expected credit losses ACL measurement model. AFS debt securities are evaluated for impairment on an individual security basis and cannot be evaluated collectively.

The Ombudsman concurred with the SO’s decision to issue the liquidity risk management MRA. The contingency funding plan did not include appropriate stress testing, the bank had exceeded its non-core funding dependence ratio limit without plans to reduce the exposure, and the on-hand liquidity calculation used by the bank overstated liquid assets.

The bank did not conduct stress testing of each of the stress scenarios outlined in its ALCO Policy. Specifically, the bank did not conduct stress testing using the financial deterioration or regulatory capital risk scenarios. Further, the stress testing for the interest rate risk and unanticipated deposit withdrawals scenarios did not consider the availability of funding sources, such as AFS securities and wholesale funds, during times of stress. In addition, stress testing did not consider the impact on earnings and capital from using these liquidity sources. The Ombudsman required the SO to correct the ROE for accuracy as one stress testing scenario did consider discounts on unsecured correspondent lines and Federal Home Loan Bank available funding. In addition, the ROE incorrectly stated that the bank conducted liquidity stress testing in both a positive and negative 200 basis point shock scenario, when it only completed a plus 200 basis point shock scenario.

The Ombudsman agreed with the SO that the bank had been operating outside of the board-approved limit for the non-core funding dependence ratio for over a year. Board minutes did not reflect approval of this exception or an action plan to reduce the exposure. The bank had also periodically operated outside of the board-approved limits for reliance on wholesale funding and total loans to capital. Management inappropriately excluded brokered certificates of deposits with maturities greater than two years when assessing risk from wholesale funding. The net non-core funding dependence and reliance on wholesale funding ratios must include brokered deposits to accurately reflect the bank’s liquidity risk. Brokered deposits contain additional liquidity risk given that a bank’s failure to maintain a well-capitalized status under 12 CFR 6 is subject to brokered deposit restrictions.

The bank inappropriately included higher risk non-agency securities in the on-hand liquidity calculation. On-hand liquidity consists of liquid assets, which are assets that can be easily and immediately converted into cash with little or no loss of value. The bank’s investment portfolio primarily contained higher risk investment types with U.S. Treasury or agency securities representing only a small portion of the portfolio. Non-agency securities do not possess the characteristics of liquid assets and differ significantly from the examples provided by the supervisory standards. They do not carry a government guarantee, are not issued by a government sponsored agency, and cannot be easily and immediately converted into cash in a range of stress scenarios. That a portion could be sold for a gain at one point in time with normal market conditions does not ensure that the non-agency securities can be easily sold at or near full value during times of stress. Management should ensure liquid assets are readily available and are not pledged to payment systems or clearing houses to ensure accessibility during the time of most need.